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According to the principle of economic voting, voters punish incumbents when the 
economy is doing badly and reward them with votes when it is doing well. As more 
and more countries have become a testing ground for this US-born theory1, researchers 
have found this relationship to be far more complex, often hinging on the specificities 
of electoral and political systems2. Although scholars have drawn distinctions between 
the majoritarian and PR settings, few have pointed to the important distinction within 
the PR setup – open vs. closed list arrangements. Informed by findings in the economic 
voting literature, this research attempts to fill this void by showing how economic con-
ditions allow voters to distinguish between high/low performers and effectively attri-
bute responsibility under an open-list PR system. By integrating open-list design into 
the model of accountability, this study transforms the way we think about the very act 
of voting. The calculus of voting is altered from the typical one- stage decision where 
a voter decides which party to support to a two-stage process with a voter also deciding 
which candidate to choose. 
1 J. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians, [in:] Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation, ed. A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin, Cambridge1999; J. Ferejohn, In-
cumbent Performance and Electoral Control, “Public Choice” 50: 5–25; G. Kramer, Short Term 
Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior:1896–1964,  “American Politicas Science Review” 65: 
131–43.
2 R. Alvarez, R. Michael, J. Nagler, J. R. Willette, Measuring the Relative Impact of Issues and 
the Economy in Democratic Elections, “Electoral Studies” 19: 237–253; C.  J.  Anderson, Eco-
nomic voting and political context: a  comparative perspective, “Electoral Studies” 19: 151–170; 
R. M. Duch, R. Stevenson,  Voting in Context: How Political and Economic Institutions Con-
dition the Economic Vote,  Cambridge 2008; G. B. Powell, G. D. Whitten, A Cross-National 
Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context , “American Journal of Politi-
cal Science” 37(2): 391–41.
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The Literature
Competitive elections are at the heart of the contemporary notion of democracy3. 
Their central role is to ensure adequate representation by allowing voters to evaluate and 
influence the government, thereby holding officials accountable to the individuals who 
elected them. Accountability is achieved when citizens are able to discriminate between 
unrepresentative and representative government and can sanction  accordingly4. Thus, 
voters hold governments to account by punishing under-performance and rewarding 
those who perform as promised5. 
Easily quantifiable, economic performance has served generations of scholars as a cri-
terion for voters’ decisions about whether to reward or punish  incumbents. Bad eco-
nomic times are associated with reduced support for the governing powers while good 
economic results are thought to help them in gathering electoral support6. The economic 
voting argument was first developed and successfully tested in the context of the US 
electoral system7. Looking predominantly at the performance and approval ratings of 
presidents, researchers have created economic voting models which have led them to con-
clude that economic performance determines presidential votes8 9.
3 G. B. Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Haven 2000; J. Schumpeter, Capital-
ism, Socialism, and Democracy, New York: Harper 1947.
4 S.  Stokes, B.  Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge 1999; 
G. B. Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Haven 2000.
5 J. Fearon, Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians, [in:] Democracy, Accountability, 
and Representation, ed. A. Przeworski, S. Stokes, B. Manin, Cambridge1999; J. Ferejohn, In-
cumbent Performance and Electoral Control, “Public Choice” 50: 5–25.
6 R. M. Duch, R. Stevenson,  Voting in Context: How Political and Economic Institutions Con-
dition the Economic Vote,  Cambridge 2008; M.  S.  Lewis-Beck, M.  Paldam, M.  Paldam, 
Economic Voting: an Introduction, “Electoral Studies” 19: 113–121; R. M. Alvarez, J. Nagler, 
J. R. Willette, Measuring the Relative Impact of Issues and the Economy in Democratic Elections, 
“Electoral Studies” 19: 237–253. 
7 G.  Kramer, Short Term Fluctuations in US Voting Behavior:1896–1964, “American Politicas 
Science Review” 65: 131–43; S. Goodman, G. Kramer, Comment on Arcelus and Melzer, the Ef-
fect of Aggregate Economic Conditions on Congressional Elections, “American Political Science 
Review” 69: 1255–1265; E. Tufte,.. Political Control of the Economy, Princeton1978; M. S. Lew-
is-Beck, M. Stegmaier, Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes, “Annual Review of Po-
litical Science” 3: 183–219. 
8 M. S. Lewis-Beck, M. Stegmaier, Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes, “Annual Re-
view of Political Science” 3: 183–219. 
9 With some controversies arising as to the motivations of voters, i.e. whether they are prospec-
tive or retrospective, sociotropic or egocentric
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Nevertheless, research into economic voting in US Congressional elections and, even 
more so, in other countries, has not yielded conclusive results10. In response, scholars 
have attempted to refine the traditional model. 
Consequently, it has been shown that open economies experience lower levels of eco-
nomic voting due to citizens recognizing the limited influence governing parties have 
on an economy affected by global trends11. In the post-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe, economic voting has been related rather to parties’ legacies (old vs. new – regime 
parties) than to parties’ incumbency status12. Another strain of research has suggested 
that economic voting depends on the type of incumbent party and voters’ evaluation of 
the goals this party aims to serve13 14. Economic voting has also been explained in terms 
of individual-level constraints such as limits to cognition and information and the im-
pact of values and evaluations15.
An influential strain of research has examined the “clarity of responsibility” argument 
by introducing variables that condition the economic vote by reflecting the political and 
economic context as well as institutional features of electoral and political systems16 17. 
10 D. A. Hibbs, Solidarity or Egoism, Arhaus 1993; A. Alesina, J. Londregan, H. Rosenthal, 
A  Model of the Political Economy of the United States, “American Political Science Review” 
87:12–33; M. S. Lewis-Beck, M. Stegmaier, Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes, “An-
nual Review of Political Science” 3: 183–219; D. Sanders, The Real Economy and the Perceived 
Economy in Popularity Functions: How Much Do Voters Need to Know? “Electoral Studies” 19: 
275–294; M. Paldam, P. Naanestad, Into Pandora’s Box of Economic Evaluations. A Study of the 
Danish Macro VP-Function 1986–1997, “Electoral Studies” 19: 123–140; C. J. Anderson, The 
End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability, 
“Annual Review of Political Science” 10: 271–96;
11 R. M. Duch, R. Stevenson,  Voting in Context: How Political and Economic Institutions Condi-
tion the Economic Vote,  Cambridge 2008; T. Hellwig, Interdependence, Government Constraints, 
and Economic Voting, “The Journal of Politics” 63(4): 1141–1162.
12 J. Tucker, Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Czech Republic, 
1990–1999, New York 2006. 
13 K.  Hamann, Linking Policies and Economic Voting: Explaining Reelection in the Case of the 
Spanish Socialist Party, “Comparative Political Studies” 33(8): 1018–48.
14 According to this view, left wing parties are punished by voters for high levels of unemploy-
ment while right wing parties are punished for high levels of inflation .
15 C. J. Anderson, The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Demo-
cratic Accountability, “Annual Review of Political Science” 10: 271–96.
16 G. B. Powell, G. D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account 
of the Political Context , “American Journal of Political Science” 37(2): 391–41; C. J. Anderson, 
Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective, “Electoral Studies” 19: 151–170; 
R. M. Alvarez, J. Nagler, J. R. Willette, Measuring the Relative Impact of Issues and the Econo-
my in Democratic Elections, “Electoral Studies” 19: 237–253
 R. M. Duch, R. Stevenson,  Voting in Context: How Political and Economic Institutions Condi-
tion the Economic Vote,  Cambridge 2008.
17 In addition, Anderson (2007, 284) hints at the possible use of elections as a selection tool. 
He argues that clarity of responsibility is an important factor only if voters perceive viable 
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This argument underscores the general differences between majoritarian and PR sys-
tems. It suggests that majoritarian systems display a higher level of economic voting 
(and thus accountability) because of their propensity to produce one-party governments. 
Conversely, PR systems that often produce minority and coalition governments are 
more likely to experience lower levels of economic voting because it is difficult for voters 
to assign responsibility to a specific party or actor18. Thus, it should not be surprising that 
we find higher levels of economic voting in the majoritarian US and lower levels in PR 
countries such as France, Germany, Norway, Italy, etc. 
While the differences between the majoritarian and PR systems have become widely 
recognized and acknowledged, few have paid attention to a  more nuanced distinction 
within the PR arrangements, which can have a profound impact on whether we detect 
economic voting at all. PR systems differ in how much freedom they allow voters in de-
termining the final slate of  candidates. Closed-list PR systems allow voters only to choose 
between party lists. Voters have no influence on the ordering of this list, and as a conse-
quence, no influence on whom from this list advances to parliament should their party 
collect enough votes. Under an open-list arrangement, voters are free to indicate their 
preference for a specific candidate on the list and, in doing so, rearrange the party lists and 
influence who becomes elected. Meanwhile, PR open-list systems have become increas-
ingly popular, especially with new democracies in Eastern Europe and Latin America.
Thus, it is troubling that the economic voting literature has not given much more 
thought to the distinction between open- and closed-list designs19 20. Instead, scholars 
alternatives other than the incumbent. This implies that voters  not only sanction or punish 
incumbents but also evaluate them and compare them to their opponents. In this case, they 
not only use retrospective but also prospective considerations. They express their preferences 
for the future rather than expressing their opinions about the past.
18 G.  B.  Powell, Elections as Instruments of Democracy, New Haven 2000; G.  B.  Powell, 
G. D. Whitten, A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political 
Context , “American Journal of Political Science” 37(2): 391–41; T. Hellwig, Interdependence, Gov-
ernment Constraints, and Economic Voting, “The Journal of Politics” 63(4): 1141–1162; C. J. An-
derson, Economic voting and political context: a comparative perspective, “Electoral Studies” 19: 
151–170.
19 J. Zielinski, K. Slomczynski, G. Shabad, Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse In-
centives of Fluid Party Systems, “World Politics” 57: 365–95; V. Smeets, F. Warzynski, Creation, 
Job Destruction and Voting Behavior in Poland, “European Journal of Political Economy” 22: 
503–519.
20 Certainly, plenty has been written about the consequences of preferential voting as it relates 
to voters casting a personal vote. It has been widely acknowledged and confirmed empirically 
that preferential voting arrangements are more indicative of personal voting than closed-list 
PR systems (Cain et al. 1987; Taagapera and Shugart 1989; Ames 1992). Since voters decide 
not only which party but also which candidate will receive a legislative seat, candidates have 
to compete with their colleagues from the same party. A party label is not as important  a cue 
for a voter and hence, candidates have the incentive to cultivate the personal vote. A more 
fine-grained analysis of differences among electoral systems illustrates that the incidence of 
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continue to treat and conceptualize accountability in the same way, irrespective of the 
type of list arrangement. Meanwhile, the traditional approach, when applied to open-
list systems, ignores a host of important information which may be potentially useful to 
scholars and researchers. As the next section shows, this is related not only to how we 
conceptualize accountability but also, and possibly more importantly, to how we concep-
tualize the very act of voting itself. 
The Traditional vs. Open-List Economic Voting Model
Traditional voting models evaluate accountability under PR systems based on a sim-
ple, one-stage voting decision where voters, based on their retrospective assessment, 
decide exclusively whether to cast their votes for the governing party. Figure 1 illustrates 
the voters’ choice under this conceptualization of voting and accountability.
Figure 1 The Traditional Model of Voting and Accountability 
personal voting is also related to details of the preferential ballot, vote pooling procedure, 
type of vote cast, and district magnitude (Cain et al. 1987; Carey and Shugart 1995). Where 
an open ballot is used, party leaders have less control over the candidate list and, hence, the 
system should be more prone to personal voting. Pooling votes across parties or candidates, 
on the other hand, encourages candidates to build not only their own but also their party’s 
reputation. Researchers are, however, not unanimous on the effects personal voting has on 
democracy. While some argue that preferential voting systems result in greater voter satis-
faction, others warn against it  impeding the effectiveness of political parties and, in effect, 
having a negative impact on democratic elections (Vid. Farrell and McAllister 2004; Pereira 
and de Silva 2009 but Sartori 1976; Pereira and Renno 2003). And while some caution against 
the detrimental effects of preferential systems and personal voting on the levels of corrup-
tion (Reed 1994, Chang 2005), others find the opposite effect when open -  and closed- list 
systems are compared (Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman 2002; Persson and Tabellini 2003). 
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Under this traditional one-stage model two findings can emerge. Firstly, one can find 
that voters, based on their perceptions of the economy, attribute responsibility for eco-
nomic outcomes to the incumbent party either by blaming it for bad economic per-
formance and voting against it or, when economic performance is satisfactory, by con-
tinuing to support it. In this situation, one concludes that the economic voting model 
applies. Secondly, one may find that voters do not vote on the basis of their economic 
perceptions. Instead, they vote based on other factors such as their party affiliation, the 
ideological proximity of a party, the personality of a party leader or a party candidate 
etc.21 22. In this case, economic voting hypotheses fail. 
This is precisely where introducing the two-stage approach gains in importance and 
has the potential to broaden our understanding of accountability under an open-list 
system of PR. The traditional conceptualization of voting, while very much appropriate 
for closed-list PR systems, fails to acknowledge the important difference preferential 
systems make for voters. By incorporating the second stage of the voting decision into 
the model of voting, this research extends the narrow scope of considerations that voters 
are allowed under the traditional economic voting models. 
Figure 2 shows how crucial the second stage of voting is for the voting calculus under 
preferential voting systems. The two-stage voting model acknowledges the greater num-
ber of options available to voters when allocating responsibility for economic outcomes. 
We learn not only about factors that influence voters’ decisions at the party- but also at 
the candidate level23. 
The key advantage of the two-stage voting model is reflected in situations where vot-
ers do not attribute responsibility for economic outcomes to a party at the first stage 
but choose to vote for a party based on other considerations. When this is the case, the 
21 J. Zielinski, K. Slomczynski, G. Shabad, Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse In-
centives of Fluid Party Systems, “World Politics” 57: 365–95; V. Smeets, F. Warzynski, Creation, 
Job Destruction and Voting Behavior in Poland, “European Journal of Political Economy” 22: 
503–519; R. M. Duch, R. Stevenson,  Voting in Context: How Political and Economic Institu-
tions Condition the Economic Vote,  Cambridge 2008.
22 Research confirms that non-economic bases for voting decisions are an important element. 
Political cleavages along social and ideological lines often influence voting choices (White-
field 2000). Non-economic factors are especially strong among new democracies where, as 
argued by Duch (2000), the risk of voting for an unknown or disliked opposition may be 
greater than the risk of voting for incumbents. Therefore, voters may be inclined to vote for 
incumbents despite bad economic performance. Thus, when ideological, social or risk consid-
erations prevail, the traditional economic voting hypothesis fails, which suggests low levels of 
economic accountability.
23 This model does not have to be used exclusively for economic voting but is also applicable 
to research on accountability in general. After quantifying a different basis for accountability 
than the economic, researchers can test for it at two different stages and for both candidate 
and party accountability. 
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traditional economic voting model fails. The two-stage model, however, has the capabil-
ity to detect whether the economy plays a role in the selection of a specific candidate. If 
so, the economic voting model still holds.
Figure 2 Two-Stage Voting Model
Thus, in preferential voting PR systems, economic voting may still take place even 
when a voter’s main decision about which party to support is not based on economic 
performance. Moreover, if conceptualized accordingly, economic voting at the second 
stage may potentially relate to holding not only parties but also individual candidates 
accountable. 
The Economic Voting Hypotheses and the Two-Stage Voting Model
The standard economic voting hypothesis against which economy-based accountabil-
ity is measured implies that “voters punish the incumbent if the economy is doing badly 
by withdrawing their support and reward the incumbent with votes when the economy 
is doing well”. The hypothesis fits well when voting is conceived as a one-stage process 
but does not reflect the aforementioned second stage of voting for open – list PR sys-
tems. Potentially, under open-list arrangements, voters can hold parties accountable even 
when voting for the parties’ candidates, if their choice of  candidate relates to the party’s 
and/or candidates’ performance in office. 
One can measure a governing party’s success by looking at the relationship between 
the number of incumbents running from a party list and the number of incumbents re-
elected to  parliament24. Voters vote for the party in power, however, they systematically 
prefer candidates who were not incumbents in the outgoing parliament. In line with the 
main assumptions of the theory of economic voting, we should see a positive relationship 
24 Of course, incumbents may also be punished by their parties, which will add to the measure-
ment error but should not invalidate the results. 
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between economic performance and the number of reelected incumbents. Thus, the ac-
countability hypothesis at the second stage of the voting decision is as follows: 
H1 Party/Candidate Accountability Hypothesis: The greater the economic down-
turn, the greater the number of incumbents from the governing party’s list fail to 
be reelected. 
However, operationalizing accountability by looking exclusively at aggregate incum-
bent performance is problematic on two counts. Firstly, most of the information is lost as 
non-incumbent performance is disregarded. Secondly, since we consider the final count 
of incumbent success for a party, we are not really able to distinguish whether (and to 
what extent) voters punish the party or individual candidates. 
Thus, I consider a second approach that relates to the list placement of the candidates 
and has the added capacity to distinguish between party and candidate accountability.25 
Since the main difference between preferential and non-preferential PR voting systems 
is voters’ ability to interfere with the order of candidates then, in contexts where parties 
are in charge of assembling the initial electoral list, voters’ decisions to rearrange this list 
should be considered an important indicator of accountability.
When party accountability is considered, I hypothesize that voters pay special atten-
tion to the candidates listed at the top of their lists. These are usually parties’ “showcase 
candidates.” These candidates include party leaders, former MP’s, famous personalities, 
etc. When voters are happy with the outcomes, they are more likely follow a party’s 
preferences and cross the first person on the list. When they are not happy with the 
outcomes, they are more likely to look into the party’s choice of candidate order and 
punish the top “showcase” candidates, sending their party a message of dissatisfaction. 
Consistently, with the retrospective voting argument, this relationship should only hold 
for the governing party’s candidates. If voters punish or reward the top candidates for 
economic results, we have an incidence of economic voting. The subsequent second – 
stage economic voting hypothesis is as follows: 
H2 Party Accountability Hypothesis: When the economy is doing badly, candidates 
of a governing party listed at the top of the list (“showcase candidates”) are  more 
likely to fall from their initial position due to preferential voting and are more likely 
to stay in their position if the economy is doing well. 
25 Note that when it is operationalized this way, economic voting assumes that the party is 
involved and has an influence on list creation. It is not the case in all PR open-list systems, 
however. In Brazil, for example, a party does not determine the initial list order. Instead, the 
initial order of candidates on a list is determined by chance.
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In addition, when list placement is considered, we are able to separate party account-
ability from the accountability of individual candidates by considering their incumbency 
status. The difference between this and the earlier approach is that now we consider 
each candidate individually whereas for hypothesis 1, we have considered them in an 
aggregate. Now, incumbent candidates are considered along with non-incumbents. If 
the economic voting argument holds with respect to individual candidates, we should 
see incumbents faring worse when the economy is declining. Thus, my last second-stage 
economic voting hypothesis states: 
H3 Individual Accountability Hypothesis: When the economy is doing badly, in-
cumbent candidates are more likely to fall from their initial position on the list than 
they are when the economy is doing well. 
It is unclear what our expectations should be here about how incumbents from gov-
erning parties differ from non-governing parties in this regard. On the one hand, one 
can imagine  non-governing party incumbents faring better when the economy is doing 
badly, since their party should not be associated with those negative outcomes. On the 
other hand, in a PR setting, with lower levels of clarity of responsibility, all incumbents 
could  feel the anger of voters who, as the economy declines, blame this decline on all 
incumbents and are ready for personal changes in  parliament.  
Testing the Second Stage of Voting
I have chosen Poland to test my theory of two-stage economic voting. Poland adopted 
an open-list PR system in 1989 and has continued to use it ever since. Electoral rules re-
quire voters to cast a preferential vote. A vote for a party only is not allowed (See Appen-
dix 1 for an example of a Voting Ballot in Poland) 26. At the same time, a degree of party 
control remains since it is up to the party to determine the initial ordering of the lists 
(essential for testing my Party Accountability Hypothesis). Top candidate placements 
are strictly controlled by all parties’ leaderships and include party “showcase candidates” 
who are supposed to gain votes, and consequently, seats in parliament 
26 A vote is counted both towards the final ordering of the candidates on the list and the final 
vote count for the party list that will establish whether this list will be awarded a legislative 
seat(s). The final ordering depends on the number of votes each candidate receives in the elec-
tions. The candidate who collects the most votes is assigned the first position on the list and 
is the first one to receive a legislative seat if the whole list was able to collect enough votes 
in the district and if it crossed the national legislative threshold (5 percent for one party and 
8 percent for a coalition). If the total votes in the district are sufficient to ensure two seats, 
the next candidate on the list- the one who received the second highest number of votes- is 
awarded a legislative seat etc. 
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Poland is also one of the most researched among Central and Eastern European coun-
tries with scholars struggling to distinguish a clear pattern according to which account-
ability works and whether or not economic voting takes place27. Potentially, distinguishing 
between two stages of voting under Polish open-list PR may produce interesting results 
confirming or dispelling the presence of economic voting and adding to the debate.  
Since Poland has held relatively few elections since 1989, I have followed the method 
of regional-level data, comparing the results each party achieved in an electoral district 
in two consecutive elections. Initiated by Pacek and Fidmurc, developed and refined by 
Tucker and later used by Zielinski et al., the distinction between regional performance 
within each election is a great tool for ensuring greater variance and providing important 
insights into the phenomenon of economic voting28. 
Incumbent Success as a Determinant of Accountability
I was able to compile regional electoral and economic data for 4 elections in the period 
between 1997 and 2007. To test my Party/Candidate Accountability Hypothesis (H1) 
the dependent variable is operationalized as the total number of party incumbents re-
elected from a district. As mentioned before, the main decision that voters have to make 
is whether they will vote for the incumbent candidate. This support for an individual on 
aggregate renders the voters’ approval of a party. 
27 J.  Bell, Unemployment Matters: Voting Patterns during the Economic Transition in Poland 
1990–1995, “Europe Asia Studies” 49(7): 1263–1291; J. Fidmurc, Political Support for Reforms: 
Economics of Voting in Transition Countries, “European Economic Review” 44:1491–1513; 
J. E. Jackson, J. Klich, K. Poznanska,  2003a. “Democratic Institutions and Economic Re-
form: the Polish Case.” British Journal of Political Science 33:85–108; B. W. Mach, J. E. Jack-
son, Employment Change, Attitude Evolution and Voting During Poland’s Transition: Longitu-
dinal Evidence, “European Journal of Political Economy” 22: 472–502; A. Owen, J. Tucker, 
Past is Still Present: Micro-level Comparisons of Conventional vs. Transitional Economic Voting 
in Three Polish Elections, “Electoral Studies” 29 (1): 25–39; A. Pacek, Macroeconomic Conditions 
and Electoral Politics in East Central Europe, “American Journal of Political Science” 38: 732–
744; D. V. Powers J. H. Cox, Echoes From the Past: the Relationship Between Satisfaction with 
Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland, “American Political Science Review” 91(3): 
617–633; S. Stokes, B. Manin, Democracy, Accountability, and Representation. Cambridge 1999; 
V. Smeets, F. Warzynski, Job Destruction and Voting Behavior in Poland, “European Journal of 
Political Economy” 22: 503–519; J. Tucker Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, 
Slovakia, and Czech Republic, 1990–1999, New York 2006; J. Zielinski, K. Slomczynski, and 
Goldie Shabad. 2005. “Electoral Control in New Democracies: The Perverse Incentives of 
Fluid Party Systems.” World Politics 57: 365–95.
28 In Poland the regional division for which economic data is available across elections is based 
on the administrative unit called voivodship. The division into voivodships, however, has not 
been uniform over the period. In 1999, an administrative reform was introduced which re-
duced the number of voivodships from 49 to 16. The data in my dataset reflects these changes 
with the administrative regions being coded differently for the elections that took place be-
fore and after 1999.
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Consistent with the assumption of the traditional retrospective voting hypotheses, 
only the governing party and its candidates are scrutinized, i.e. should be punished (its 
incumbent candidates fail to be reelected) if the economy is doing badly and rewarded if 
the economy is doing well. Consequently, I include an independent dichotomous vari-
able to distinguish the governing (Prime Minister’s) party in elections (PM Party).29 
The general expectation is that, with all else equal, incumbent parties are able to gather 
more votes than other parties, considering their access to the different types of political 
resources that incumbency grants.
However, incumbency status alone is not indicative of economic voting. According to 
the economic voting literature, the economy should only have an effect on the governing 
parties. Therefore, my main variable of interest is the interaction between the economic 
and the governing party variable.
Of the possible economic variables (GDP,  income levels, inflation, and unemploy-
ment), I  have decided to exclusively use unemployment to operationalize economic 
performance in Poland. Unlike GDP, unemployment data has been available for each 
election. Because of the regional approach, I have not been able to include inflation as 
a measure of economic performance since inflation rates are rarely specified on a  re-
gional level. Income measures, on the other hand, are problematic since they have not 
been adjusted for inflation. 
I have operationalized unemployment as an independent variable in terms of percent-
age change in its levels between the year preceding elections and the election year. As 
opposed to the electoral data, which is at an electoral district level, unemployment data 
is available only at the voivodship level, i.e. each candidate in a district in a voivodship 
is assigned the value for this voivodship (see Appendix 2 to compare the differences in 
the level of divisions, note that districts cannot be shared between voivodships, thus, as-
signing the voivodship’s unemployment levels to districts is relatively straightforward) 
30. I predicted that as unemployment rises, a governing party’s vote  declines (PM Party 
X Unemployment). 
29 The choice to operationalize a governing party as a PM Party is somewhat arbitrary given the 
coalitional nature of  Polish governments over the period. An alternative would be to code 
all parties that have been in the governing coalition as incumbents. However, in the Polish 
case, such a practice could have proven problematic given the frequent changes and even 
breakdowns in the governing coalitions. Operationalizing the party of the Prime Minister as 
the governing party is, thus, more straightforward and clear cut. Consequently, for the 1997 
elections the incumbent party is the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD), for the 2005 elections, 
it is again the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and for the 2007 elections it is the Law and 
Justice party (PiS).
30 In Poland, the regional division for which economic data is available across elections is based 
on the administrative unit called voivodship. The division into voivodships, however, has not 
been uniform across the years. In 1999 an administrative reform was introduced, which re-
duced the number of voivodships from 49 to 16 (Compare Figures 2 and 3 in Appendix 2). 
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In addition, I apply a control for the total number of incumbents who are running for 
reelection. Some of the incumbents may have decided not to run for different reasons or 
a party may have decided not to run them on their list. Also, I add a party strength vari-
able that acts as a control for the share of votes (voteshare) a party received in a district. 
This is to account for smaller parties that naturally have fewer incumbents running on 
their list as well as for the number of total candidates a party ends up having elected. 
Since vote share and the number of elected candidates are highly correlated, I can only 
include one of them and the first is more precise. I use a natural log of the share of votes 
a party won in a district. This variable is operationalized as the share of votes the whole 
party list received in a district and has the same value for each candidate on each party 
list in a particular district. For a similar reason, given the differences between regions 
and elections, I apply a control for district magnitude. Since there is a  large disparity 
between districts, I also use a natural log in this case31. Larger districts mean that more 
candidates are elected there, and thus, more candidates are running. As a result there is 
a greater probability of incumbents running in a district of a  large magnitude. Lastly, 
I apply a control for the specific circumstances of each election by introducing election 
dummies. The result is a dataset where the unit of analysis is the number of reelected 
incumbents in a district in a specific election (1997, 2001, 2005, or 2007). Each observa-
tion represents a party running in a district in each of these elections.
Since my dependent variable is fairly normally distributed and approximates a con-
tinuous variable, I use OLS regression to estimate my model (Table 1). Unemployment 
on its own has no effect; however, it has the expected effect for a governing party. Even 
though the effect is small (3.4 %) it is highly statistically significant (p< 0.001). The 
higher the increase in unemployment levels, the fewer incumbents from a governing 
party succeed. This result is confirmed by a positive and statistically significant interac-
tion term, both when the statistical significance is provided for the joint effect of the 
economy and the incumbency/governing party’s status. 
The data in my dataset reflects these changes with the administrative regions being coded 
differently for the elections that took place before and after 1999. Figure 1 in Appendix 2 
presents the current division into electoral districts.
31 (district magnitude in Poland has varied depending on the year of election and number of 
districts between a minimum of 3 and a maximum of 19)
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Table 1
List Effects of Change in Unemployment
Incumbents Running 0.396***(0.03)
Governing Party -0.572***(0.08)
Unemployment Change -0.002(0.00)
Unemp. X Governing Party -0.032***(0.00)
Voteshare (ln) 0.621***(0.02)
District Magnitude (ln) 0.561***(0.07)
Elections 2001 0.515*(0.21)
Elections 2005 0.363***(0.17)
Elections 2007 0.152*(0.08)
Constant -1.623***(0.15)
Joint Effect  
Unempchng + Unemp.Chng, X 
Gov. Party
-0.034***
(0.01)
Gov.Party + Unemp.Chng X Gov. 
Party 
-0.605***
(0.08)
R-sqr
N
0.638
1852
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<0.05, ** 
p<0.01, *** p<0.001
In addition, the results reveal a puzzling finding that the governing party is always 
at a disadvantage. Normally, with all else equal, we would predict the opposite, i.e. that 
governing parties would have the incumbent advantage32. This counterintuitive finding 
32 R.  S.  Erikson, The Incumbency Advantage in Congressional Elections, “Polity” 3, p. 395–405; 
M. Marsh, The Voters Decide?: Preferential Voting in European List Systems,  “European Journal 
of Political Research” 13: 365–378; A. Gelman, G. King, Estimating Incumbency Advantage 
without Bias,  “American Journal of Political Science” 4: 1142–64; S. W. Desposato, J. R. Pet-
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could be potentially attributed to the hyper-accountability associated with Central and 
Eastern European countries33 34.
Thus, the economic voting hypothesis is confirmed when the second-stage of voting 
is considered. Polish voters have the ability to punish their parties, even if they decide 
to vote for them. They can do so by expressing their approval/disapproval by voting for 
or against these parties’ incumbent candidates. Is this relationship confirmed when all 
candidates for legislative office are considered and when we are able to distinguish be-
tween party and candidate accountability? Let us turn to consideration of an alternative 
measurement of party and candidate accountability.  
List placement as a Determinant of Accountability
Given that the main difference between preferential and non-preferential PR voting 
systems is voters’ ability to interfere with the order of party lists, voters’ decisions to rear-
range this list should be considered an important indicator in determining accountabil-
ity. Consequently, my dependent variable is conceptualized as a change from the initial 
position of a candidate (position on the list as decided by the party) to a final position 
as decided by the voters who cast a preferential vote35. The unit of analysis is the value 
of change from the initial to the final position for a candidate in an electoral district in 
parliamentary elections. The dependent variable can take a maximum value of positive 
35 and a minimum value of negative 30, which means that the most a candidate ever fell 
down the list was by 30 positions and the most a candidate advanced up the list was by 
3536. The value of 0 indicates that a person remained at the initial position as assigned 
rocik, The Variable Incumbent Advantage: New Voters, Redistricting, and the Personal Vote, 
“American Journal of Political Science” (47):18–32; J. Karp, Candidate Effects and Spill-Over in 
Mixed Systems: Evidence from New Zealand, “Electoral Studies” 28: 41–50; B. Ames, Electoral 
Strategy Under Open-List Proportional Representation, “American Journal of Political Science” 
39: 406–433. 
33 A.  Roberts, Hyperaccountability: Economic voting in Central and Eastern Europe, “Electoral 
Studies” 27: 533–546.
34 To check for the possible effect of a party’s association with an old or new regime, I have 
divided my dataset and run my model for new and old regime parties separately The models 
(included in the Appendix) have only to an extent confirmed the hypotheses advanced by 
Tucker. Only the new regime parties seem to be punished for bad economic results. For the 
old regime parties, unemployment levels do not seem to matter at all.
35 As mentioned earlier, in Poland voters do not have the choice whether they want to vote 
for a party list or for a specific candidate on this list. Instead they have to vote for a specific 
person on the list. When talking to the party leaders, I was informed that about 40% of the 
total votes casts are considered preferential/personal votes as opposed to those who vote for 
the first person on the list as a sign of party (and not specific candidate) support.
36 Such extreme changes from initial list positions are possible thanks to the high magnitude of 
some legislative districts and electoral law provision which allow parties to compose lists with 
the number of candidates reaching up to twice the district magnitude. Thus, at its maximum 
in the Warsaw I district, parties are able to compose a list with up to 38 candidates. Parties try 
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by the party.  Zero is also the median value for the dependent variable (for a summary 
statistic of all variables in this model see Appendix 3).
I follow the operationalization of the remaining variables from the earlier model. I in-
clude incumbency variables for both the party (PMParty) and the candidates (Incum-
bent) and use the change in Unemployment levels to gauge economic performance. Since 
the expectations about the effect of unemployment on voting within the framework 
of economic voting cannot be derived without considering the effect of incumbency 
variables, I  combine the variables accordingly (IncumbentXUnemployment and PM-
PartyXUnemployment) which reflects the notion that voters reward or punish incum-
bent candidates and parties based on retrospective evaluations of economic results. I also 
include important control variables from the previous model, such as district magnitude 
and party share of the vote in the previous election. 
In addition, to control for the electoral strength of a party at the time of elections, 
I create a new instrumental variable that should approximate a party’s electoral attrac-
tiveness to the voters. One can imagine a  situation in which a party which was very 
popular in  previous elections, having gained a lot of votes or even having become a gov-
erning party, losing its support over the term. I operationalize this variable as legislative 
to use this opportunity since every vote, even if cast for the last candidate on the list, adds to 
a party’s vote count, which in turns determines how many (if any at all) seats  a party will get 
in the parliament. 
Figure 3
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turnover, which is the rate at which a party’s incumbent candidates are reelected. Figure 
1 presents legislative turnover across elections37. 
Lastly, I apply a control for candidates’ gender. Research has found that gender is an 
important criterion for voting38. In general, women usually perform worse than men 
in elections. However, it has also been found that women benefit from the preferential 
vote39. 
All in all, my dataset includes data on four Polish legislative elections from 1997 to 
2007. The unit of analysis is a change in the position of a candidate on a party list in 
a particular district in specific elections and the statistical model appears as follows:
Y= β0 + β1INCUMBENT + β2DIST.MAG. + β3VOTE SHARE + β4PM PARTY + 
β5FEMALE + β6UNEMPLOYMENT + β7INCUMBENT x UNEMPLOYMENT 
+ β8PM PARTY x UNEMPLOYMENT + β9TURNOVER + β10ELECTION 1997 
+ β11ELECTION 2001 + β12ELECTIONS 2005 + β13ELECTIONS2007+ ei
When testing for accountability, we first want to see how the economy affects changes 
in positions on the list. Since I conceptualize my dependent variable (change in the initial 
position on the list) in such a way that it approximates a linear variable (runs from negative 
30 to positive 35), I could consider using OLS regression to test my hypotheses.  Howev-
er, since position may have a profound impact on how voters cast their votes, we should 
consider running a model for each position separately40. Once new dependent variables 
are construed for each position, their distribution is dramatically different and OLS es-
37 With the notable exception of the 2007 elections, only about 50 percent of the incumbent 
candidates who decided to run again were routinely re-elected. If all incumbent candidates 
are calculated the re-election rate is only 30 percent. A possibly more direct and better way 
to measure a party’s attractiveness would be to compare the electoral results for consecutive 
elections in a district. However, the data that exists does not allow for such operationaliza-
tion. This is due to two main factors. First, redistricting in 1999 causes a lot of confusion as to 
which areas should be included in calculating the changes in electoral results. Secondly, the 
changes among parties (changes in names, breakdowns, and coalitions between parties) make 
this task nearly impossible for the 1997–2007 elections. 
38 
39  Also, Polish parties seem to perceive the differences between voters’ attitudes towards men 
and women as some parties have taken particular interest in how women are situated on the 
list and some of my interviewees believed that preferential voting especially benefited those 
women listed early on the list. Thus, to control for the possible impact of candidates’ gender, 
I include a variable distinguishing between female and male candidates
40 On the impact of positions on voting vid. Zielinski et al. 2005; Miller and Krosnick 1998.
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timation cannot be used.41 Instead, I apply a maximum likelihood estimation that allows 
us to look for the probabilities of candidates dropping down or advancing up the list. 
I chose to look at the first three positions when considering party and candidate ac-
countability. This choice is arbitrary, though directed by important considerations. First-
ly, it is pragmatic given the sheer number of positions on the lists in Polish elections. 
Secondly, districts and parties vary greatly in the number of candidates they allow on 
their lists and by using the first three, I “standardize” the districts to an extent. Thirdly, 
the first three positions are most likely to display the parties’ “showcase candidates”. This 
is not to say that the analysis could not be expanded to further positions once a qualita-
tive study had determined that they had been assigned as showcase candidates as well. 
Since my modified dependent variable indicates how each candidate’s position on the 
list was changed by voters, I need the absolute values of the previous dependent variable 
(change in position) for each position.  Since this is always a positive number, I need 
to account for a possible fall by those initially listed second or third on the list. This is 
straightforward for the first position. For the second position, an absolute value for a fall 
and advance by one position would be the same and therefore, the variable created is abs 
(position change -1). For the third position, a similar process is applied though now we 
just take the abs(position change – 2) for those listed third42. 
The new dependent variable requires a different regression estimation technique since 
it includes only positive values and is skewed to the left for each of the three positions. 
Considering the distribution of the variables, I choose negative binomial estimation for 
all three positions (For a detailed explanation of the choice of estimation technique and 
variable distributions see Appendix 5). 
Table 2 presents the results. The main variables of interest that measure account-
ability are the interaction terms between the economy and the governing party and the 
economy and the incumbency status of a candidate, which relate to party and individual 
candidate accountability respectively. The results are mixed. They indicate statistical sig-
nificance for each of the interaction terms for the candidates listed in the first position. 
For those listed second, only incumbents are significantly affected by changes in unem-
ployment while for those listed third, only candidates from the governing party seem to 
be held accountable by voters.
41 Running OLS regression in the first instance may be a good way to quickly scan the data and 
results (vid. Appendix 4 for the OLS regression results and description).
42 Calculated this way, for the first position my new dependent variable - absolute change in 
position - takes the value of 0 if a candidate does not experience any change, 1 if they fall by 
one position, 2 if they fall by two positions etc. For the second position, the value of 0 means 
that they actually advance one position, 1 means they stay in the same spot, 2 means they fall 
one position etc. For the third position, 0 means that they go up by two positions, 1 by one 
position, 2 means they stay in the third position, 3 means they fall to the fourth position etc.
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Table 2 
Absolute Change in Position (Negative Binomial Estimation)
  Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Incumbent -0.809***(0.21)
-0.515***
(0.07)
-0.498***
(0.08)
District Magnitude (ln) 0.549**(0.20)
0.273***
(0.06)
0.319***
(0.05)
Vote share (ln) 0.081(0.06)
-0.015
(0.02)
-0.021
(0.01)
Governing Party -0.308(0.27)
0.068
(0.07)
0.020
(0.06)
Female 0.431*(0.18)
-0.191***
(0.05)
-0.098*
(0.04)
Unemployment 0.015(0.01)
0.002
(0.00)
0.005
(0.00)
Incumbent X Unemployment -0.021*(0.01)
-0.007*
(0.00)
0.001
(0.00)
Gov. Party X  Unemployment 0.049***(0.01)
-0.006
(0.00)
-0.005
(0.00)
Not-reelected Incumbents 0.032(0.06)
0.015
(0.02)
-0.027
(0.01)
Election 1997 1.463*(0.64)
0.081
(0.18)
0.092
(0.15)
Election 2005 0.183(0.25)
-0.106
(0.07)
-0.002
(0.06)
Election 2007 -0.390(0.67)
-0.187
(0.18)
0.068
(0.15)
Constant -3.185***(0.63)
0.378*
(0.19)
0.577***
(0.16)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
However, the statistical significance of the interaction terms should not be measured 
unconditionally. An effect of a variable may be significant at some levels of the variable and 
insignificant at others. Table 2A includes the results of the joint effect for the economy and 
candidate incumbency as well as the economy and the candidate’s governing party status. 
It shows an interesting pattern as those listed in the first position are more likely to drop to 
lower positions when there has been an increase in unemployment if they are from the gov-
erning party. This effect is consistent with my Party Accountability Hypothesis (H2). The 
“showcase candidates” of the governing party are punished for  poor economic performance, 
which implies that economic voting under preferential voting systems exists.  For those 
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listed in the second and third positions, on the other hand, this is not the case, i.e. the con-
ditional effect of unemployment is not statistically significant. Incumbency has a significant 
effect on candidates in all positions but there is no joint effect of unemployment on incum-
bents. Thus, the Candidate Accountability Hypothesis (H3) does not find  confirmation43.
Table 2A  
Absolute Change in Position 
Joint Effect
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
PM Party + Gov. X Unemployment -0.259    (0.26)
0.062
(0.07)
0.0146
(0.06)
Unemployment + Gov. X 
Unemployment
0.06***
(0.02)
-0.004
(0.01)
-0.0002
(0.00)
Incumbent + Incumbent X 
Unemployment
-0.830***
(0.21)
-0.522***
(0.07)
-0.497***
(0.08)
Unemployment + Incumbent X 
Unemployment
-0.006
(0.017)
-0.006
(0.005)
0.006
(0.005)
lnalpha constant 1.215***(0.12)
-1.358***
(0.08)
-1.692***
(0.08)
Prob>=chi-sgrt 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo R-sgrt 0.043 0.017 0.018
N 1851 1849 1850
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
Since maximum likelihood estimates are difficult to interpret in substantive terms, 
I calculate predicted values to learn the substantive effect of the economy on candidates’ 
positions on the list. 44 The results of simulations for each of the models (for each of the 
positions) are presented in Table 3. The predicted values relate to one’s fall or advancement 
on the list. Considering how the dependent variable was constructed, the interpretation 
of the predicted values for the first position is straightforward. Values in proximity to zero 
43 Given the prominent position of the economic voting literature, that stresses the importance 
of parties’ legacies in new democracies, I  have also checked whether old and new regime 
hypotheses are applicable for individual accountability, i.e. whether new regime candidates 
are negatively affected by a decline in economic performance as opposed to old-regime can-
didates, who should be affected positively by an economic downturn. I have run the regres-
sion for old and new regime parties separately but have not noticed any effect that would be 
consistent with old/new regime hypotheses.
44 I use “Clarify,” which is a  simulation technique to present statistical results using STATA 
which by default draws 1000 sets of parameters. Next, the simulated parameters are converted 
into, in this case, predicted values (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003).
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indicate a candidate staying in the first position. This is also the most common occurrence. 
However, in some cases, the predicted mean value is much higher than zero (albeit not 
reaching one). Are the differences consistent with economic voting hypotheses?
The simulations were performed for specific values of variables of interest, i.e. can-
didate incumbency, party incumbency and unemployment. I  have also distinguished 
between different elections and run separate simulations for each of them. Since we 
are really interested in the effect of unemployment, I have firstly calculated  differences 
between minimum and maximum values of unemployment change for each year, i.e. for 
1997 the maximum change was -10.07% and the minimum was -45.15 %; for the 2001 
elections the maximum change was 25.27% and the minimum change was 8.81%; for the 
2005 elections, the maximum change was 11.46% and the minimum change was 3.21%; 
and for 2007 the maximum change was -12.72% and the minimum was -32.2%. 45 
For the sake of interpretation, it is important to note that the minimum value for un-
employment indicates a decrease in the unemployment level while the maximum value 
indicates an increase in the unemployment level. Consequently, according to economic 
voting hypotheses we should expect that, with all else equal, higher unemployment change 
should produce greater dissatisfaction among voters and therefore a greater fall down the 
list. Conversely, lower unemployment change should cause candidates to rise up the list. 
Other than unemployment, I have used different values for incumbency and governing 
party status to see whether and how they influence the impact unemployment has (or does 
not have) on a candidate’s position on the list. Thus, I provide results for changes in unem-
ployment for incumbent and non-incumbent candidates for both governing and non-gov-
erning parties. The theory of  (retrospective) economic voting suggests that we should expect 
unemployment to have the greatest impact on incumbent candidates and governing party 
candidates since these candidates are under voters’ scrutiny for their performance in office.
Table 3 presents the results of the simulations for each position. As expected, un-
employment has the greatest impact for those who are first on their party’s list. It is 
important to note that positive values in this case are negative in effect, i.e. candidates 
value higher positions on the list which are lowest in numerical value (i.e. position no. 1 
is the most sought after and highest position despite the fact that it has the lowest value). 
Adding to this value indicates candidates falling down the list. The worsening of eco-
nomic outcomes impacts almost all top-listed candidates and causes them to fall down 
the list. Only the top-listed incumbent candidates from a non-governing party are not 
affected by negative changes in the economy. On the other hand, those incumbents of 
a governing party listed second on a list are benefiting from worsening economic condi-
45 I have used unemployment maxima and minima for each respective election as opposed to 
using one overall maximum (25.57%) and overall minimum (-45.15%) to avoid out of sample 
predictions (although the authors of  “Clarify” state that out of sample predictions are pos-
sible to make with this software) (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).
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tions. Thus, the simulations add an interesting caveat to our findings. It seems as if there 
is a  reshuffle of the top two positions on governing parties’ lists. When the economy 
declines, voters are less likely to vote for the top candidate. They do not, however, look 
far for a replacement but go ahead and choose the second person on the list.
Table 3 
First Differences in Final List Position conditioned on the value 
of the change in unemployment (ranging from minimum to 
maximum change, i.e. from best to worst economic conditions)
Variable Specification 1997 2001 2005 2007
POSITION 1
Incumbent and Gov. Party 0.12*(0.07)
0.02*
(0.01)
0.03*
(0.01)
0.02*
(0.01)
Non-Incumbent and Gov. Party 0.25*(0.11)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.02)
Non- Gov. Party and Non-Incumbent 0.25*(0.11)
0.06*
(0.02)
0.07*
(0.02)
0.04*
(0.02)
Non-Gov. Party and Incumbent -0.01(0.05)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.01
(0.02)
-0.002
(0.006)
POSITION 2
Incumbent and Gov. Party -1.06*(0.57)
-1.12*
(0.73)
-0.93*
(0.54)
-0.85*
(0.43)
Non-Incumbent and Gov. Party -0.59(0.66)
-0.63
(0.73)
-0.54
(0.65)
-0.43
(0.53)
Non- Gov. Party and Non-Incumbent -0.59(0.70)
-0.62
(0.73)
-0.55
(0.65)
-0.45
(0.52)
Non-Gov. Party and Incumbent -0.51(0.52)
-0.57
(0.60)
-0.47
(0.45)
-0.42
(0.38)
POSITION 3
Incumbent and Gov. Party 0.02(0.43)
-0.02
(0.41)
-0.01
(0.39)
0.01
(0.43)
Non-Incumbent and Gov. Party -0.06(0.66)
-0.12
(0.61)
-0.14
(0.62)
-0.09
(0.59)
Non-Gov. Party and Non-Incumbent -0.08(0.64)
-0.11
(0.61)
-0.12
(0.59)
-0.08
(0.64)
Non-Gov. Party and Incumbent 0.52(0.44)
0.46
(0.36)
0.44
(0.37)
0.51
(0.42)
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<0.05
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Those in the second position on party lists seem to benefit significantly and substan-
tially from the negative impact of increases in unemployment on the list leaders, albeit 
only if they are from the governing party and if they are incumbent candidates. For each 
election year, an increase in unemployment helps those candidates to move to the top of 
the list (i.e. by approximately one position). Non-incumbent candidates and incumbents 
from non-governing parties neither experience a  similar benefit nor are they affected 
negatively. The same holds for those listed in the third position irrespective of their in-
cumbency status or party ID. 
At the same time, it is worth noting that not only PM Party candidates but also 
non-PM party candidates are punished for bad economic results. This finding could be 
related to the specificity of the PR electoral system where it is usually difficult to cre-
ate a majority one-party government and, thus, not only the governing party but also 
coalition partners may seem to voters to be responsible for economic results. In addi-
tion, minority governments are often formed in PR systems. This is precisely the case in 
Poland where during the time period studied parties have either governed as a coalition 
or as a minority government. While under coalition government junior parties may take 
some of the blame, in a minority government situation not only the governing party but 
also opposition parties may be viewed as responsible for economic results, since to enact 
any law, the opposition must co-operate with the governing party. Lack of cooperation 
may also negatively impact both sides as voters grow tired of bickering and gridlock 
and blame all parties for unsatisfactory economic results. Why do non-governing party 
incumbents not suffer under these conditions? If one assumes that in a PR system voters 
distribute responsibility to all parties, parties in power should suffer more under nega-
tive economic conditions than the opposition (or junior coalition) parties. It is possible 
that while incumbency advantage cannot counter this negative impact for the governing 
party candidates, it may have this effect for non-governing party candidates. Figures 2 
and 3 illustrate the changes in the first position and changes in position 1 and 2 for the 
governing party’s incumbent candidates. 
At first sight, the results of simulations reveal the small effect of the economy. In fact, 
however, advancement by a whole position from second to first place on the list is sub-
stantial as it raises the chances of becoming re-elected. Most importantly, this effect is 
significant for incumbent candidates and governing parties, confirming the main argu-
ment advanced in this work, that economic voting exists if voting is considered as a two-
stage decision. Just as in the traditional economic voting literature, here the incumbency 
of a candidate and party also play a key role, providing voters with cues about whether 
to punish or reward a candidate based on economic results. 
In addition to the effect of the main variables of interest, the effect of some other 
variables is noteworthy. Again, governing party status does not help as we do not note 
“incumbency advantage” with respect to parties. Being a candidate of a governing party 
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does not matter in terms of changes in position. This is an important finding. With all 
else equal, voters treat candidates the same, irrespective of which party these candidates 
come from. There is not a built-in benefit or disadvantage to being a governing or op-
position party’s top candidate. 
Still, incumbent advantage seems to work for individual candidates since incumbents 
are less likely than non-incumbents to change their position to a lower one as a result of 
voters’ intervention. List position also matters. Those incumbents listed first on the list 
are less likely to fall than those listed later on the list. This may be related to the primacy 
effect as mentioned by Miller and Krosnick (1998), according to which if voters have no 
Figure 4
Figure 5
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knowledge of candidates but like the party, they will be more likely to vote for the person 
listed first on the list despite the fact that they do not know much about this person. 
On the other hand, those listed first on the list as prominent candidates may have been 
advertised more than others by the party and become more known to voters or were 
more known to the voters to begin with. Therefore, voters are more likely to vote for the 
candidates they recognize.
The district magnitude variable works as predicted for all positions. The larger the 
district magnitude, the more potential rivals each of the candidates has in a district and 
the larger their chances are of falling from their initially high positions or the smaller 
the chances they have of advancing. The strength of the candidate’s party in the district 
does not matter for any of the positions, and nor do changes in unemployment levels 
alone matter. Being a female candidate has different effects for the first, second and third 
positions. Female candidates listed first are more likely to fall from their positions than 
male candidates but those listed second or third are less likely to fall than their male 
counterparts. 
Conclusion
Economic voting is a well-established concept within research focusing on political 
accountability. Voters punish incumbents when the economy is doing badly and reward 
them when it is doing well. In this setting politicians are agents who act within the 
political realm with voters acting as principals. This paper contributes to this body of 
work as it takes the first step to considering preferential voting as a vehicle for assigning 
responsibility to parties and candidates. To do so it re-conceptualizes the act of voting 
itself. While until now researchers have usually viewed it as a one stage decision, here 
voting is conceptualized as a two stage process: one stage in which voters decide which 
list (party) to choose and a second stage where voters, having decided their preferred 
party, decide which candidate on the list they prefer. 
As shown in the example of Polish legislative elections, voters take this opportunity 
and assign responsibility to the parties at the second stage of the vote by negatively im-
pacting the incumbent count or candidates’ positions on the list. Interestingly, only gov-
erning party candidates listed first on the list are negatively impacted by a bad economy, 
which indicates that Party and not Candidate Accountability is at work. This seems to be 
a confirmation of the conclusions Zielinski et al. (2005) came to in their research on 
Polish legislative elections: that incumbents seem to be able to hide behind party labels 
to avoid responsibility. Parties seem to be held accountable by voters as their “showcase 
candidates” fall down the list when economic results are not satisfactory to voters. And 
even though they do not fall far, as voters seem to opt for the candidate “next in line,” the 
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move may have an impact on who will enter  parliament in small districts and districts 
where the governing party’s support is particularly weak, either due to historical weak-
ness in this area or due to general vulnerability in the elections. 46 For individual candi-
dates, this result implies that the first position, so much sought after by candidates in PR 
elections, may not always be to their benefit. All in all, candidates in open-list systems 
should possibly rethink their strategy under conditions of bad economic results if their 
goal is to be elected or re-elected. 
Albeit only devised in a one-country context, these findings are very important on 
theoretical and empirical grounds. Theoretically, they urge scholars to reconsider the 
way they operationalize voting under open list designs. Empirically, this work provides 
evidence of accountability under open-list design at both stages of voting. Most impor-
tantly, it finds that the traditional measures of accountability are insufficient for open-
list systems. When the second stage of voting is considered, accountability gains a new 
dimension.  The evidence of accountability in the second stage of voting suggests that an 
open-list PR electoral system may be better and more conducive to accountability than 
we thought. Until now, PR systems have been considered less responsive to voters due 
to lower accountability than majoritarian systems. In exchange, PR systems have been 
described as more representative. This research suggests that preferential PR systems 
may offer a middle ground for those trying to find both high representativeness and high 
accountability. Voters under open-list arrangements seem to be able to use those systems 
to their advantage. They can even have their cake and eat it, too, by voting for their party 
while punishing it if they feel the party’s performance in office was not good enough. 
46 Interestingly, those listed third on the list are not affected by the economy, which only con-
firms my decision to look only at the top slate of candidates.
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Appendix 3 
Table 3.1  
Summary Statistics
Variable       N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Change in Position 39573 0.00 4.63 -30 35
Change in Position No. 1 2712 0.23 0.88 0 23
Change in Position No. 2 2708 2.25 2.07 0 30
Change in Position No. 3 2710 3.34 2.48 0 32
Incumbent Difference 39573 -0.23 1.38 -9 5
Incumbent 39571 0.04 0.21 0 1
PM Party 39572 0.12 0.33 0 1
District Magnitude 39573 11.04 4.55 3 46
District Magnitude (ln) 39573 2.33 0.40 1.10 3.829
Sum of incumbents 39573 0.84 1.23 0 8.000
No of incumbents on a list 
(ln) 39573 0.45 0.54 0 2.197
 Incumbents reelected 39573 1.07 1.75 0 11.000
Vote share 39572 9.79 11.69 0.03 97.350
Vote share (ln) 39572 1.49 1.44 -3.51 4.578
No. of votes for a list 31074 36404.51 53271.29 127 618942
Female 39573 0.20 0.40 0 7
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Appendix 4 
Table 4.1 
 OLS Regression: Change in List Position 
  Position 1 Position 2 Position 3 Position 4 Position 5 Position 6
Incumbent 0.136*(0.06)
0.998***
(0.17)
1.437***
(0.25)
1.664***
(0.34)
2.710***
(0.45)
1.599**
(0.58)
District Magnitude (ln) -0.182*(0.07)
-0.672***
(0.16)
-1.076***
(0.19)
-1.087***
(0.22)
-1.407***
(0.25)
-1.483***
(0.26)
Vote share (ln) -0.017(0.02)
0.032
(0.04)
0.088
(0.05)
-0.046
(0.06)
-0.094
(0.06)
-0.143*
(0.07)
PM Party 0.023(0.08)
-0.141
(0.17)
-0.079
(0.21)
-0.115
(0.24)
0.449
(0.26)
0.426
(0.27)
Female -0.070(0.06)
0.421***
(0.13)
0.327*
(0.14)
1.156***
(0.17)
0.847***
(0.19)
0.554**
(0.20)
Change in 
Unemployment
-0.004
(0.01)
-0.004
(0.01)
-0.017
(0.01)
0.016
(0.02)
0.007
(0.02)
0.004
(0.02)
Incumbent X Chng. In 
Unemployment
0.004
(0.00)
0.013
(0.01)
0.000
(0.01)
0.008
(0.02)
0.035
(0.02)
0.004
(0.03)
PM Party  X Chng. In 
Unemployment
-0.008*
(0.00)
0.014
(0.01)
0.018
(0.01)
-0.006
(0.01)
0.012
(0.01)
-0.002
(0.01)
Total Incumbents- In-
cumbents reelected
0.007
(0.02)
-0.042
(0.05)
0.103
(0.05)
0.057
(0.06)
-0.151*
(0.07)
-0.105
(0.07)
Election 1997 -0.430*(0.22)
-0.640***
(0.17)
-0.318
(0.56)
0.111
(0.23)
1.707*
(0.72)
1.596*
(0.76)
Election 2001 0.000(.)
-0.446
(0.48)
0.000
(.)
-0.367
(0.66)
0.000
(.)
0.000
(.)
Election 2005 -0.042(0.08)
-0.189
(0.39)
0.013
(0.21)
-0.552
(0.52)
0.389
(0.27)
-0.064
(0.28)
Election 2007 -0.047(0.22)
0.000
(.)
-0.201
(0.57)
0.000
(.)
0.586
(0.72)
1.100
(0.77)
Constant 0.300(0.23)
0.261
(0.41)
0.713
(0.59)
0.835
(0.57)
0.892
(0.76)
1.537
(0.81)
R-sqr 0.022 0.048 0.062 0.062 0.094 0.087
N 1851 1849 1850 1837 1810 1784
Numbers in parentheses are standard errors; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
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I decided to focus on the first 6 positions only. This has both pragmatic as well as 
substantive grounds. 
It will simplify my analysis and provide clearer results. More importantly, there is 
a valid reason to assume that only the candidates listed in the early positions are in fact 
recognizable to voters. Also, these are the obvious “showcase candidates” of particular 
parties. 
Table 5.2 presents the OLS results when Model 1 is applied for the first 6 positions. 
The coefficient of the incumbency variable is always highly statistically significant and 
positive. A positive coefficient in this case means a drop down the list since a higher 
placement value equals a lower position. Candidates across all six positions are affected 
negatively by incumbency. Still, those listed earlier lose less than those who are listed 
later on the list. This is an unexpected result, since informed by previous research we 
expected incumbents to have the advantage over non-incumbents. Interestingly, the dis-
advantage decreases as we move to the top of the list. Those listed first are affected nega-
tively by incumbency twenty times less than those listed fifth on the list.  
A noteworthy result reveals the effect of unemployment or rather lack thereof across 
the candidates in most cases. Nor does incumbency status condition the impact of the 
unemployment variable. The only impact of unemployment we find is for governing 
party candidates who are listed in the first position on the list. When unemployment 
rises, those who are listed first seem to benefit. This is a finding that contradicts my ex-
pectations about economic voting at the second stage of the vote.  
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Appendix 5
Figure 5.1
Figure 5.2
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Since the values are non-normal, OLS estimation would be flawed. I consider two 
possible maximum likelihood estimation techniques: Poisson and negative binomial re-
gression. The statistical model needs to account for two very specific features of the data 
distribution. Poisson and negative binomial regressions are very similar to each other as 
they both allow for the recognition of the skewed distribution of probabilities for ad-
vancing/falling on the list and better model the relationship that we observe with open 
list electoral systems. My dependent variable includes only positive values and is skewed 
to the left, which fits both Poisson and negative binomial estimation. Poisson models 
presume that the variance fits exactly, i.e. all counted events follow the same distribu-
tion. In contrast, negative binomial estimation includes an error term accounting for 
variance around the estimated means. Thus, while for Poisson we compute probabilities 
by computing exp (α+βx), for negative binomial we compute exp (α+βx) * exp (error) 
which is nothing more than  exp (α+βx) * alpha, where alpha is the dispersion parameter 
that adds the possible variance to the model. Thus, having alpha significant in the model 
means that heterogeneity is present and we should use negative binomial that does not 
assume homogeneity. While Poisson regression assumes that all counted events follow 
the same distribution, the negative binomial allows for variance, i.e. adds the error term. 
The parameter alpha is statistically significant in all my models (alpha is statistically 
different than zero) presented in Table 2 (in the text), which means that the data is over-
dispersed and negative binomial regression is a better fit for the data than the Poisson 
Figure 5.3
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model.  Also, other fit statistics such as AIC and BIC confirm the choice of negative 
binomial over Poisson (see Table 2 in the text).
I have also checked whether zero inflated negative binomial estimation is not more 
appropriate for my model when the dependent variable is an Absolute Change in Posi-
tion 1. The zero inflated negative binomial estimation is useful in cases where the num-
ber of zeros is excessive and the zero values cannot be explained in the same way as the 
non-zero ones. As Figure 3 in Appendix 5 indicates and Table 5.1 shows in detail, there 
is an inflated number of zeros for those candidates listed first on the list (i.e. most of the 
candidates remain in their position). 
Therefore, I need to test whether zero inflated negative binomial regression is more 
appropriate for estimating Absolute Change in Position 1. This does not seem to be the 
case for Absolute Change in Position 2 and 3 (See Table 1). For the candidates listed 
in the second and third positions by their party, their values for dropping/advancing on 
the list are much more uniformly distributed and therefore regular negative binomial 
estimation can be applied.
To test which regression fits the data better, I run the zero inflated negative binomial 
estimation where the dependent variable is presumed to be inflated by the variables 
related to incumbency, governing party status, and unemployment. Having done this, 
I apply the Vuong test. Statistically significant z-values for this test suggest that a zero-
inflated negative binomial is a better choice for a specific set of data. This is not the case 
with regards to my data, however. The Vuong test produces a z-value of 0.95 Pr>z = 0.17), 
which is not statistically significant at customarily accepted significance levels.
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Table 5.1 
Distribution (Frequency) of the “Absolute Change ” Variables
Position Absolute Change From Position 1
Absolute Change From 
Position 2
Absolute Change 
From Position 3
0 2300 201 69
1 314 1097 516
2 66 560 654
3 17 354 500
4 4 185 327
5 4 123 209
6 1 76 157
7 1 38 105
8 2 32 67
9 1 16 35
10 - 12 27
11 - 4 13
12 - 1 12
13 - 3 4
14 - 1 6
15 - 1 5
16 - 1 2
17 - 1 -
19 1 - 1
22 1 - -
23 - - -
24 - 1 -
30 - 1 -
32 - - 1
Total 2712 2708 2710
SUMMARY
To have your cake and eat it too:  accountability under a preferential voting system
Informed by the findings in the economic voting literature and using an original dataset on 
Polish elections this research breaks away from this established practice and goes a step further 
by showing how economic conditions allow voters to distinguish between high/low performers 
and effectively attribute responsibility under open-list PR systems where voters can choose not 
only among parties but also among individual candidates. By integrating open-list design into 
the model of accountability this study transforms the way we think about the very act of voting.
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